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Abstract. We analyze the security of a fingerprinting scheme proposed
at IWDW 2005. We show two results, namely that this scheme (1) does
not provide seller security : a dishonest buyer can repudiate the fact that
he redistributed a content, and (2) does not provide buyer security : a
buyer can be framed by a malicious seller.
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1 Introduction
Two of the most celebrated applications of watermarking are copyright
protection and piracy protection. For this, a robust watermarking scheme
is employed to embed the content owner’s mark to prove his ownership;
and to embed a mark (so called a fingerprint) of the content buyer so
that the content binds to the buyer and any dishonest buyer who later
redistributes this content can be traced.
An interesting body of literature in watermarking has formed around
the design and analysis of buyer-seller watermarking (BSW) schemes,
which are typically protocols that allow marks identifying both the seller
(it is commonly assumed that the owner is the seller) and the buyer to
be embedded into the content, so that copyright and piracy protection
can be provided. In addition to ensuring this basic seller security, BSW
schemes also provide buyer security [34], i.e., a buyer is assured that he
cannot be framed by malicious sellers.
⋆ The second author acknowledges the Malaysia eScience grants (01-02-01-SF0032,
01-02-01-SF0060).
Related Work. It turns out that designing secure BSW schemes is more
subtle than first thought. For instance, the original proposal that high-
lighted the need to provide buyer security in [34], was shown inadequate
in [25] since the seller knows the final copy of the fingerprinted content
and may well have redistributed this itself.
Meanwhile, a few subsequent BSW schemes proposed with different
additional features like anonymity [20], without trusted third parties
(TTP) [10] and extension for multiple purchases [11] were later found
to have security problems [10, 19, 18]. A few more recent schemes can be
found in [24, 37, 38].
BSW schemes typically employ techniques from both watermarking
and cryptography. See [13, 21, 33] for cautions when integrating the two
fields.
This Paper. We show the first known analysis of a recent BSW scheme
proposed by Yong and Lee at IWDW 2005 [37]. Our results indicate that
this scheme does not provide seller security and buyer security, properties
that are desired by any basic BSW scheme.
Section 2 gives the preliminaries and notations used throughout this
paper. We describe the Yong-Lee BSW scheme in Section 3, and then
present our attacks in Section 4. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
We list here basic requirements of a secure anonymous buyer-seller wa-
termarking scheme (the interested reader can refer to [25, 37] for details):
• Traceability. The buyer who has illegally redistributed watermarked
contents can be traced.
• Non-Repudiation. The guilty buyer cannot deny having created
unauthorized copies of the content.
• Non-Framing. No one can accuse an honest buyer.
• Privacy: Anonymity and Unlinkability. Without obtaining an
illegally distributed copy, the seller cannot identify the buyer. Also, the
purchases of honest buyers should not be linkable even by a collusion
of all sellers, registration center and other buyers.
Note that in any BSW schemes, it is assumed that the underlying water-
marking scheme used for embedding is collusion-tolerant and robust.
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2.1 Cryptographic Preliminaries
In a public key cryptosystem [26], each party A possesses a pair of public-
private key (yA, xA) which is obtainable from a certificate authority or
registration center RC. For convenience, we let yA ≡ g
xA mod p [26],
where p is a large prime and g is a generator of the multiplication group
Z
∗
p of order (p − 1). Also, unless otherwise specified, all arithmetic op-
erations are performed in Z∗p. Any party can encrypt a message for A
using yA, but only A can decrypt this message with xA. This ensures
confidentiality. Furthermore, A can sign a message by encrypting it with
xA, denoted as signxA(M), so that anybody can verify by using yA that
the message really originated from A. This provides authentication and
non-repudiation.
Both the seller and the buyer have registered with the registration cen-
ter RC, and have their own pair of keys which are (yA, xA) and (yB, xB),
respectively. Note that the RC also has its own public-private key pair
(yRC , xRC).
2.2 Notations
For ease of explanation, we use the following common notations for BSW
schemes:
S the seller who owns and sells the digital content X
B the buyer who buys the digital content
RC registration center who can issue certificates
J the judge
⊗ fingerprint embedding (watermarking) operation
X original content with t elements (x1, x2, ..., xt)
X ′ fingerprinted content, where X ′ = X ⊗ F for a fingerprint F
H(·) collision-resistant hash function
EU (x) public-key encryption of x under party U ’s public key
EncK(x) symmetric-key encryption of x under secret key K
CEncK(x) commutative symmetric-key encryption of x under secret key K
3 The Yong-Lee Anonymous BSW Scheme
We describe the anonymous BSW scheme proposed by Yong and Lee
proposed at IWDW 2005 [37]. As is common for this type of scheme, it
consists of three phases; i.e. registration, fingerprinting and identification.
For simplicity, we depict the registration phase and fingerprinting phase
in Fig. 1.
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Buyer, B Registration Center, RC
Randomly select:
x1, x2 ∈R Z
∗
p s.t. x1 + x2 = xB
Compute y1 and encrypt x2:
y1 = g
x1 , ERC(x2)
yB ,y1,ERC(x2)
−−−−−−−−−−→ Decrypt ERC(x2) using xRC
Compute: y2 = g
x2
Check: y1 · y2
?
= yB
Cert(y1)
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− If pass, return Cert(y1)
(a) Registration Phase
Buyer, B Seller, S
y1,Cert(y1),payment
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Verify Cert(y1) (using yRC).
If pass, generate and embed:
F iB = {f
i,1
B , f
i,2
B , . . . , f
i,t
B }
Xi = {xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,t}, i = {0, 1}.
XiB = {x
i,1
B , x
i,2
B , . . . , x
i,t
B } where
xi,jB = x
i,j ⊗ f i,jB
Generate 2 secret keys K0 and K1:
Ki = {ki,1, ki,2, . . . , ki,t}, i = {0, 1}.
Encrypt and obtain:
X iB = {x
i,1
B , x
i,2
B , . . . , x
i,t
B } = EncKi(X
i
B)
Encrypt K0 and K1 (using KS):
Ci = {CEncKS (ki,1), CEncKS (ki,2), . . . , CEncKS (ki,t)}
= {ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,t}
Randomly generate:
X
0
B ,X
1
B ,C0,C1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
LB = {l1, l2, . . . , lt}
for lj = {0, 1}
Then construct:
C′ = {c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
t}
where c′j = clj ,j
Encrypts C′ (using KR):
D1 = {d1, d2, . . . , d t
2
} and
D2 = {d t
2
+1, . . . , dt}, where
di = CEncKR (c
′
i).
D1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Decrypt D1 with KS:
U1 = {u1, u2, . . . , u t
2
}, where
Decrypt U1 (using KR).
U1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ui = CEnc
−1
KS
(di) = CEncKR(klj ,j).
Then, decrypt 1th t/2 frames:
x
lj,j
B for j = {1, 2, . . . ,
t
2
}.
Generate:
TB = EJ(LB) and sigx1(TB)
TB ,sigx1 (TB),D2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Verify (using y1) sigx1(TB)
If verified, it decrypts D2 with KS:
Decrypt U2 (using KR).
U2,sigxS (TB)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−− U2 = {u t
2
+1, . . . , ut}
Then, decrypt 2nd t/2 frames:
XB = {x
l1,1
B , x
l2,2
B , . . . , x
lt,t
B }.
TNB=EJ (H(XB),H(XB)⊕H(LB)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Record RecB =
〈y1, Cert(y1), F
0
B, F
1
B, TB , sigx1(TB), TNB〉
(b) Fingerprinting Phase
Fig. 1. Yong-Lee Anonymous BSW Scheme
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Registration. This phase involves two parties: the buyer B and reg-
istration center RC. Both are assumed to have public and private key
pairs, i.e., xI is the private key of party I while its public key is yI = g
xI .
Certificates issued by RC are signed by its private key xRC , and can be
publicly verified by anyone using RC’s public key yRC .
1. B randomly chooses two secret values x1, x2 ∈ Z
∗
p such that x1+x2 =
xB ∈ Z
∗
p . Then B sends (yB, y1 = g
x1), ERC (x2) to RC, and convinces
via zero knowledge to RC of its possession of x1.
2. RC decrypts ERC(x2) and computes y2 = g
x2 and checks that y1y2 =
yB. If verified, it returns to B a certificate Cert(y1) which states the
correctness of y1 and the registration of B.
Repeating this phase several times allows B to obtain several different
pairs (y1, x1) which it will use as its unlinkable and anonymous key pairs.
Fingerprinting. This phase involves two parties: the buyer B and the
seller S.
1. B sends y1, Cert(y1) and payment to S as a purchase request for the
digital content X.
2. On receiving this, S verifies Cert(y1) and generates two fingerprints
for B, F 0B and F
1
B ; i.e.,
F iB = {f
i,1
B , f
i,2
B , . . . , f
i,t
B }, i = {0, 1}.
3. S generates two identical copies of the digital content X0 and X1,
and splits each copy into t frames, i.e.,
Xi = {xi,1, xi,2, . . . , xi,t}, i = {0, 1}.
4. S then embeds F iB into each of the t frames of X
i for i = {0, 1}, by
using the specific embedding construction in [14], to obtain
XiB = {x
i,1
B , x
i,2
B , . . . , x
i,t
B }, i = {0, 1},
where
xi,jB = x
i,j ⊗ f i,jB , i = {0, 1}, j = {1, . . . , t}.
5. S generates two secret key vectors K0 and K1. Each key vector consists
of t randomly selected keys:
Ki = {ki,1, ki,2, . . . , ki,t}, i = {0, 1}.
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6. S encrypts the each of the t frames of XiB (i = {0, 1}) using each of the
t keys of Ki, using symmetric key encryption EncK(·). This produces
two encrypted digital content vectors of frames, X 0B and X
1
B , such that
X iB = {x
i,1
B ,x
i,2
B , . . . ,x
i,t
B }
= EncKi(X
i
B)
= Encki,j (x
i,j
B ), i = {0, 1}, j = {1, . . . , t}.
7. S randomly selects a secret key KS and encrypts the two key vectors
K0 and K1 via commutative encryption CEncK(·), producing two
encrypted key vectors C0 and C1, i.e.
Ci = {ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,t}
= {CEncKS (ki,1), CEncKS (ki,2), . . . , CEncKS(ki,t)}, i = {0, 1}.
S sends (X 0B ,X
1
B , C0, C1) to B.
8. B randomly generates a t-bit integer LB = {l1, l2, . . . , lt} for lj =
{0, 1}, j = {1, . . . , t}, restricted to the fact that LB should not be all 0
or all 1. It then constructs a new encrypted vector C ′ = {c′1, c
′
2, . . . , c
′
t}
where c′j = clj ,j. To elaborate, this means that each c
′
j is either c0,j or
c1,j depending on the bit lj of LB.
9. B randomly chooses a secret key KR and encrypts C
′ via commu-
tative encryption to obtain an encrypted vector that it halves into
two consecutive parts D1 = {d1, d2, . . . , d t
2
} and D2 = {d t
2
+1
, . . . , dt},
where
di = CEncKR(c
′
i)
= CEncKR(CEncKS(klj ,j))
= CEncKS(CEncKR(klj ,j)).
B sends D1 to S.
10. S decrypts D1 with KS to get the vector U1 = {u1, u2, . . . , u t
2
}, where
ui = CEnc
−1
KS
(di)
= CEnc−1KS(CEncKS(CEncKR(klj ,j)))
= CEncKR(klj ,j).
S sends U1 to B.
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11. B now obtains t/2 decryption keys by decrypting each ui with key
KR, and can thus decrypt the first t/2 frames of the encrypted digital
content x
lj ,j
B for j = {1, 2, . . . ,
t
2
}.
12. B generates TB = EJ(LB) and a signature sigx1(TB). These are evi-
dence for resolving piracy disputes in future.B sends (TB , sigx1(TB),D2)
to S.
13. S verifies sigx1(TB) with y1. If verified, it decrypts D2 with KS to
obtain the vector U2 = {u t
2
+1
, . . . , ut}, where ui is similar to that in
Step (10). S sends (U2, sigxS (TB)) to B.
14. B now obtains the remaining t/2 decrypting keys by decrypting each
ui of U2 with key KR, thus it can decrypt the remaining t/2 frames
of X
lj ,j
B for j = {
t
2
+1, . . . , t}. Hence, B now has the complete finger-
printed content XB , i.e.
XB = {x
l1,1
B , x
l2,2
B , . . . , x
lt,t
B }.
B sends TNB = EJ(H(XB),H(XB)⊕H(LB)) to S.
15. S records RecB = 〈y1, Cert(y1), F
0
B , F
1
B , TB , sigx1(TB), TNB〉 in its
database.
Identification. This phase involves three parties: the seller S, the judge
J and the registration center RC.
1. After finding an illegally redistributed digital content, S extracts the
fingerprint from it. S then sends X 0B and X
1
B with the transaction
record RecB to the judge J .
2. J decrypts TB and TNB and checks that LB corresponds to XB , and
that TB was signed by B. It verifies the presence of frames of either
F 0B or F
1
B in XB based on LB . If all are verified, it sends y1 to RC
and asks for the identity of B, and informs S.
4 Insecurity of the Yong-Lee BSW Scheme
Attacking the Seller Security. The security of the seller is captured
by the notion of traceability and non-repudiation.
Nevertheless, we show how the seller security can be defeated by a
malicious buyer. The attack follows.
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1. B performs an entire fingerprinting protocol session with S, thus
in the end B has the content XB and S has recorded RecB = 〈y1,
Cert(y1), F
0
B , F
1
B , TB , sigx1(TB), TNB〉 in its database.
2. B initiates another fingerprinting protocol session with S, this time
requesting for some other digital content X ′. During the protocol,
B proceeds normally, except that it reuses the y1, Cert(y1), TB ,
sigx1(TB), TNB from the previous session. It is clear that S will cor-
rectly verify y1 from Cert(y1), and TB from sigx1(TB). Furthermore
S cannot check TNB since it is encrypted for only J to decrypt.
3. Thus in the end B obtains the fingerprinted X ′B and S records Rec
′
B =
〈y1, Cert(y1), F
′0
B , F
′1
B , TB , sigx1(TB), TNB〉 in its database.
4. B can repeat this as many times as it wishes. Now B can pirate all the
fingerprinted content X ′B it received from its sessions with S except
for the first, XB .
5. When S discovers that X ′B has been redistributed and initiates the
identification protocol, B can counter that it only bought once from
S, for the digital content XB . It can argue that the other X
′
B have
nothing to do with him, but that S reused y1, Cert(y1), TB , sigx1(TB),
TNB to frame him for distributing X
′
B .
6. The judge J cannot reach a conclusion in favour of S because TNB
will not correspond to X ′B since it corresponds only to XB .
This attack shows to some extent a failure of traceability since B cannot
be judged guilty for redistributing X ′B . This also shows a failure of non-
repudiation because the only part that binds to B for which B cannot
repudiate is TB = EJ(LB), which is independent of the digital content
bought by B.
Attacking the Buyer Security. The security of the buyer is captured
by the notion of non-framing. Additionally, when privacy is desired then
this is captured by anonymity and unlinkability.
We demonstrate two cases for which non-framing can be violated. The
first follows, by exploiting TB .
1. S guesses all possible values of LB and for each guess checks if TB =
EJ(LB). Since LB is only a 32-bit vector, this requires just 2
32 trials.
2. S does the fingerprinting protocol steps 3 and 4 for X ′, where the
old fingerprints F 0B and F
1
B are reused, and embedded into any other
content X ′ for which S wants to frame B. This gives X
′0
B and X
′1
B .
3. Since LB has been obtained, S knows the fingerprinting pattern chosen
by B. So S can embed the same pattern into any other content X ′.
Denote the fingerprinted content as X ′B .
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4. S computes TN ′B = EJ(H(X
′
B),H(X
′
B)⊕H(LB)).
5. S initiates the identification protocol to frame B for pirating X ′B ,
by sending X
′0
B and X
′1
B together with transaction record Rec
′
B = 〈y1,
Cert(y1), F
0
B , F
1
B , TB , sigx1(TB), TN
′
B〉 to the judge J .
6. J decrypts TB and TN
′
B and will correctly verify that LB corresponds
to X ′B , and that TB was signed by B. It will also correctly detect in
X ′B the presence of the fingerprinting pattern based on LB . Thus, this
will cause J to agree that B has pirated X ′B , and it will send y1 to
RC to ask for the identity of B, and informs S.
The second attack below also violates non-framing in the sense that even
if B was dishonest and redistributed XB , it should only be held guilty for
XB and not for any other content X
′
B for which it did not redistribute.
This is in line with the common legal system. If this is violated, it is still
unfair to B; for instance if XB is some inexpensive content whose copy-
right is claimed by S only for a brief period thus B might feel it is ok to
redistribute among friends after some time. However, once XB is obtained
by S it can frame B for redistributing some other very expensive content
X ′B and for which it holds copyright indefinitely. The attack follows.
1. S does not know the fingerprinting pattern based on LB that was
selected by B to be embedded into content X to form XB . However,
S does have the copies of X0B embedded with F
0
B , and of X
1
B embedded
with F 1B .
Proceeding frame by frame in sequence, S compares each frame of
XB with each frame of X
0
B and of X
1
B . Since each frame is processed
independently (like in electronic code book way), S will successfully
obtain the fingerprinting pattern LB.
2. The rest of the attack steps is similar to the steps 2 to 6 of the first
attack above.
Our first attack exploits the fact that LB can be bruteforced in practice,
and that TB can be used for verifying these guesses. Even if LB is too
long to be bruteforced in practice (but this is not the case for the Yong-
Lee scheme), our second attack still applies. It exploits the fact that
the seller S knows the fingerprint set {F 0B , F
1
B} used to embed into the
content thus it can know the fingerprinting pattern chosen by the buyer
B by simple frame comparison once a copy of the fingerprinted content
XB is available. In both attacks, the major flaw we exploit is the same
for which we exploited in our attack on Seller Security in the previous
subsection: that the only thing that binds to the buyer B is sigx1(TB),
which is independent of the content bought by B. This allows the seller
9
S to transplant the same fingerprinting pattern to any other content for
as many times as it wishes to frame B.
5 Concluding Remarks
The Yong-Lee BSW scheme attempts to eliminate the inefficiency of some
existing BSW schemes by using symmetric key encryption and commuta-
tive encryption. The flaws that we have demonstrated on this scheme do
not stem from the use of these encryption methods, but exploits the fact
that the scheme was not sufficiently binding a buyer to the content. This
causes a buyer to repudiate and thus get away with illegal redistribution
of bought content, breaking seller security. This also makes it easier for
a seller to transplant a buyer’s fingerprint to other contents for framing,
thus breaking buyer security.
Our results show that the Yong-Lee scheme does not offer the secu-
rity for which it is designed to provide, and therefore leaves doubts on the
design of this scheme, considering the state of the art of BSW schemes
thus far, and the fact that the Yong-Lee BSW scheme is a fairly recent
proposal that should have taken the state of the art into its design con-
sideration. We caution against simple fixes that patch our attacks in this
paper since experience has shown that the break-and-fix cycle loops in-
definitely, for instance see [17–19, 30–32] where attacks were applied to
protocols [8–11, 20, 22, 6, 36] that improved on existing ones. We suggest
instead, that if BSW schemes are required, to consider other schemes like
[24, 38] that have not been shown to fall to any attacks that counter their
design goals.
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